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I. Introduction

David Siller and Chen-Chen Wang were whistleblowers.
Both men became aware of ongoing fraud in the course of their
employment, and both alerted the authorities. Yet because of the
sharply contrasting approaches taken by different federal
circuits, one of these whistleblowers was rewarded, and one went
away empty-handed. 1
David Siller worked for a health care products distributor in
San Antonio, Texas. Siller learned that a large manufacturer was
overcharging the government for its products and brought a qui
tam 2 whistleblower action under the False Claims Act (FCA). 3
The district court dismissed Siller’s claim because the allegations
in Siller’s suit had already come to light in a previous lawsuit
against the manufacturer. On appeal, however, the Fourth
Circuit reversed, finding that because Siller had independent
knowledge of the fraudulent activities, and because Siller had
disclosed his information to the government before filing suit, he
qualified as an “original source” under the FCA and thus could
recover damages.
Chen-Chen Wang was not so fortunate. Wang, a mechanical
engineer for the FMC Corporation (FMC), noticed that FMC was
defrauding the government on several defense contracts. Wang
notified the U.S. government and filed suit under the FCA. The
district court dismissed Wang’s claim, and the Ninth Circuit
1. The following scenarios are based on U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that “a qui tam
plaintiff need not be a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations
on which the qui tam action is based in order to be an original source under
section 3730(e)(4)(B)”) and Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that “[b]ecause he had no hand in the original public disclosure of
[fraud], Wang’s claim . . . is blocked by the jurisdictional bar of section
3730(e)(4)(A)”). Both cases will be discussed in further detail. See infra text
accompanying notes 126–69 (discussing one prong of a three-way circuit split).
2. The phrase “qui tam” is the legal shorthand for the Latin phrase qui
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who
pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own,” and the
phrase dates from at least the time of English jurist Sir William Blackstone. See
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000)
(defining the term).
3. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the
United States, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3729–33 (West 2011)) (providing for civil actions for false claims).
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affirmed the dismissal. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit read a requirement into the FCA that when allegations of
fraud have been made public, a qui tam plaintiff cannot recover
damages unless the plaintiff was a source of the public disclosure.
Since Wang knew of the fraud but did not file his complaint until
others had publicized the corporation’s fraudulent actions, the
Ninth Circuit held that the FCA’s “public disclosure” provision
barred Wang’s suit.
Siller and Wang are examples of qui tam relators—
whistleblowing private citizens who discover that the federal
government is being defrauded and then file suit under the FCA.
The FCA, which dates back to the Civil War, allows relators like
Siller and Wang to share in the recovery of damages from
dishonest contractors. 4 Since the FCA’s enactment, Congress and
the federal courts have sought to prevent both the underenforcement and the abuse of the statute, resulting in a
tumultuous history that has swung between both extremes. 5
Both Siller and Wang encountered the FCA’s public
disclosure bar and its original source exception. Yet because of
the contrasting interpretations the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
applied, Siller’s and Wang’s suits came to dramatically different
conclusions. This Note reviews these dueling interpretations, as
well as changes made to the FCA by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). 6 This Note argues that the courts
should narrowly construe the PPACA’s amendments in order to
achieve the “golden mean” between valuable qui tam actions and
parasitic, opportunistic litigation. 7 Specifically, under the
amendments, the term original source should apply to a relator
who has either informed the government of his allegations before
such information becomes public, or, in cases where the
allegations are already in the public domain, the relator has
valuable information which substantially assists the government.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 33–35 (discussing the background of
the FCA).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 36–78 (noting various ways courts
have handled the FCA).
6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 218–59 (discussing the 2010
amendments).
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Part II examines the history of the FCA from its inception
until the crucial 1986 amendments to the statute. 8 Part III
reviews the three-way circuit split over the proper interpretation
of original source that developed after the 1986 amendments, as
well as the PPACA amendments. 9 Finally, Part IV considers the
amendments made by the PPACA, using empirical evidence and
the legislative history of similar provisions to argue that an
original source under the FCA is a relator who has disclosed his
information to the government prior to any public disclosure, or
who has knowledge of fraud that would substantially assist the
government’s case. 10
II. Background of the False Claims Act
Congress sought to address fraudulent schemes like the ones
David Siller and Chen-Chen Wang encountered by enacting the
False Claims Act, 11 a statute that allows charges to be brought
against government contractors who submit false claims for
payment to the federal government. 12 This section first explains
the origin and mechanics of the FCA. 13 Next, this section reviews
the extremes of abuse and disuse between which qui tam actions
under the FCA have historically swung. 14 Finally, this section
considers key amendments to the FCA enacted in 1986 15 and
2010. 16
8. See infra text accompanying notes 11–89 (discussing the FCA’s history).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 90–217 (discussing the circuit split).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 218–59 (arguing for a narrow
interpretation of the new definition).
11. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the
United States, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3729–33 (West 2011)) (providing for civil actions for false claims).
12. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 17–32 (discussing how the FCA
works).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 36–78 (noting the extremes of overenforcement and disuse).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 79–203 (discussing the crucial 1986
amendments to the FCA).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 204–17 (discussing the 2010
amendments to the FCA).

OPEN THE DOOR, NOT THE FLOODGATES

369

A. The False Claims Act
The FCA is one of the fastest-growing areas of federal
litigation and is the federal government’s primary tool for
catching companies who submit false claims to government
agencies or programs. 17 The stakes are high: In 2010, the United
States Department of Justice, Civil Division, reported
$3,080,446,526 in total fraud-related settlements and
judgments. 18 These judgments, of course, do not reveal the cost to
the government of undetected fraud. Further, the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in enacting the crucial 1986 amendments
to the False Claims Act, also noted the non-monetary harms
resulting from fraud being perpetrated on the federal
government:
[Fraud] erodes public confidence in the Government’s ability to
efficiently and effectively manage its programs. Even in the
cases where there is no dollar loss—for example, where a
defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet
there are no apparent defects—the integrity of quality
requirements in procurement programs is seriously
undermined. A more dangerous scenerio [sic] exists where in
the above example the part is defective and causes not only a
serious threat to human life, but also to national security. 19

In order to combat fraud, the FCA relies substantially 20 on
qui tam actions, which allow a private citizen to bring suit on
behalf of the federal government and to recover damages. 21 The
17. See Joel D. Hesch, Understanding the “Original Source Exception” to
the False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the Supreme Court’s
Ruling in Rockwell v. United States, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 1 (2008)
(noting that the FCA is “the federal government’s primary anti-fraud tool for
recovering ill-gotten gains from companies submitting false claims for payments
to more than twenty government agencies or programs, such as Medicare and
the military”).
18. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview, October 1, 1987–
September 30, 2010 (Jan. 10, 2011), www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/CFRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Fraud
Statistics] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (citation omitted).
20. See id. at 2 (noting that “the Committee believes only a coordinated
effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of
defrauding public funds”).
21. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1) (West 2011) (providing that plaintiffs
“shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the
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FCA recognizes that the Attorney General of the United States
has a responsibility to diligently investigate a violation under the
statute, and that if the Attorney General finds that a person has
violated or is violating the FCA, the Attorney General may
prosecute the offender himself. 22 Nevertheless, a private citizen
“may bring a civil action for a violation of [FCA] section 3729 for
the person and for the United States Government.” 23 The action
is brought in the name of the government and “may be dismissed
only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to
the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.” 24 The FCA also
requires that a “copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information the person
possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule
4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 25
The complaint must be originally filed in camera and is not
disclosed to the defendant or the public for sixty days unless the
court orders otherwise. 26 The federal government, however, may
elect to intervene, and, if it does, the government must “proceed
with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint
and the material evidence and information.” 27 During this sixtyday period, unless the government receives an extension, it must
“proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be
conducted by the Government,” or “notify the court that it
declines to take over the action.” 28 If this is the case, the private
qui tam plaintiff “bringing the action shall have the right to
conduct the action.” 29 At that point, only the government may
proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to
which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action”).
22. See id. § 3730(a) (providing that if the Attorney General “finds that a
person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring
a civil action under this section against the person”).
23. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
26. See id. (providing that the complaint “shall remain under seal for at
least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so
orders”).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 3730(b)(4).
29. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
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intervene or bring a related action based on those specific facts. 30
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States ex rel.
Stinson v. Prudential Insurance Co., 31 the qui tam plaintiff may
proceed unless information on which the plaintiff’s suit relies
triggers one of the FCA’s jurisdictional bars. 32
B. The FCA’s Early History: From Disuse to Abuse
Congress originally enacted the FCA during the Civil War,
allowing private citizens to bring suit on the government’s
behalf. 33 Congress wanted to use “a rogue to catch a rogue” 34 by
inducing informers to betray their coconspirators, and the FCA’s
qui tam provisions encourage relators to come forward by
allowing them to receive from 15% to 25% of the recovery or
settlement. 35
The FCA, however, was not heavily employed until the 1930s
and 1940s, when the New Deal’s increase in government
spending created the opportunity for contractors to defraud the
government. 36 Unfortunately, this renaissance of the FCA
fostered parasitic litigation, with one of the most egregious

30. See id. § 3730(b)(5) (providing that no person “other than the
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action”).
31. See U.S. ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1152 (3d
Cir. 1991) (noting that a claim may proceed unless “information on which the
claim is based triggers one of the jurisdictional bars contained in section
3730(e)”).
32. See id. (noting that a claim may proceed unless “information on which
the claim is based triggers one of the jurisdictional bars contained in section
3730(e)”).
33. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (current version at
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–31 (West 2011)).
34. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955–56 (1863)). The
opinion incorrectly cites pages 955–96.
35. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1) (West 2011) (noting that plaintiff shall
“receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement of the claim”).
36. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 679 (noting that “increased government
spending opened up numerous opportunities for unscrupulous government
contractors to defraud the government”).
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examples being United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess. 37 In that
case, the plaintiff, Marcus, claimed that several electrical
contractors had defrauded the government. 38 Marcus brought a
qui tam action under the FCA, 39 alleging that the contractors had
an informal practice of averaging their prospective bids. 40 A
contractor chosen by the others would then submit a bid equal to
that average but lower than the other contractors’ bids. 41 Hence,
the government was deceived into paying more for services than
it would have paid otherwise.
Marcus won in the district court. 42 The Third Circuit,
however—taking a strictly literal view of the FCA—reversed. 43
The Third Circuit emphasized that prior to Marcus’s action, the
defendants had already faced an indictment for defrauding the
government and had pled no contest. 44 The Third Circuit agreed
with respondents’ contention that Marcus had received his
information, not from independent investigation, but from the
existing indictment; hence he should not have been allowed to
proceed with his qui tam action. 45
37. See U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1943) (holding that
qui tam relator could proceed with his suit and reversing appellate court).
38. See id. at 539 (noting that plaintiff charged “respondents with
defrauding the United States through the device of collusive bidding”).
39. See id. (“[T]he petitioner in the name of the United States and on his
own behalf brought this action under [§] 5438 (18 U.S.C.A. [§§] 80, 82–86), and
[§§] 3490–3493 (31 U.S.C. [§§] 231–234, 31 U.S.C.A. [§§] 231–234), of the
Revised Statutes.”).
40. See id. n.1 (describing that the “pattern of the collusion was the
informal and private averaging of the prospective bid which might have been
submitted by each appellant”).
41. See id. (“An appellant chosen by the others would then submit a bid for
the averaged amount and the others all submitted higher estimates.”).
42. See id. at 540 (noting that “verdict and judgment for $315,000 were
rendered against the defendants, of which $203,000 was for double damages and
$112,000 was an aggregate of $2,000 sums for 56 violations”).
43. See id. at 540–41 (noting that the Third Circuit construed the statute
“with ‘utmost strictness’ on the premise that qui tam or informer actions ‘have
always been regarded with disfavor’ by the courts”).
44. See id. at 545 (noting that before the “filing of this action these
respondents were indicted for defrauding the government and on a plea of nolo
contendere were fined $54,000”).
45. See id. (noting that “the petitioner received his information not by his
own investigation, but from the previous indictment” and hence the qui tam
statute “should not under such circumstances be construed as permitting suit by
the petitioner”).
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The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
court, rejected both of these lines of reasoning. The Court found
that not only did the statute apply in this instance 46 but the
plaintiff’s lack of independent knowledge of fraud did not bar his
suit: “Even if, as the government suggests, the petitioner has
contributed nothing to the discovery of this crime, he has
contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for which
the Act was passed.” 47 The Court handled the statute strictly,
noting that the text of the FCA was devoid of any limiting
qualifications as to who may bring a private action. 48 The Court
also pointed out that the FCA’s sponsor in the Senate explicitly
would have allowed even a district attorney, who would most
likely gain all knowledge of a fraud from his official position, to
pursue a qui tam action. 49 The Court rejected the government’s
policy arguments, finding that the government was relying on
what Congress should have done, not what Congress did; the
Court protested that its hands were tied by the statutory
language. 50 The Court believed that, while the government’s
contentions had teeth, these arguments were best addressed to
Congress—it was not the Court’s job to change the wording of the
statute. 51 For the Court, the fact that Congress passed this
version of the FCA was clear and convincing evidence that
Congress “concluded that other considerations of policy
outweighed those now emphasized by the government.” 52
46. See id. (“We conclude that these acts are covered by the statute under
consideration.”).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 546 (“‘Suit may be brought and carried on by any person,’
says the Act, and there are no words of exception or qualification such as we are
asked to find.”).
49. See id. (noting that the “sponsor of the bill explicitly pointed out that he
was not offering a plan aimed solely at rewarding the conspirator who betrays
his fellows, but that even a district attorney, who would presumably gain all
knowledge of a fraud from his official position” could file).
50. See id. at 546–47 (“The government presses upon us strong arguments
of policy against the statutory plan, but the entire force of these considerations
is directed solely at what the government thinks Congress should have done
rather than at what it did.”).
51. See id. at 547 (“[T]he trouble with these arguments is that they are
addressed to the wrong forum. Conditions may have changed, but the statute
has not.”).
52. Id.

374

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365 (2012)

Marcus fostered a dramatic increase in “parasitic” qui tam
litigation, in which relators simply copied indictments or
congressional investigations already in the public domain. 53 Such
suits served to diminish “the government’s ultimate recovery
without contributing any new information.” 54
C. The Pendulum Swings Again: From Abuse to Disuse
In the wake of the Marcus decision, Congress took up the
Supreme Court’s invitation and amended the FCA to prune back
excessive lawsuits. 55 Thus, the FCA, as amended in 1943, barred
qui tam suits that were “based upon evidence or information in
the possession of the United States . . . at the time such suit was
brought.” 56
Yet this correction of the opportunistic era represented by
the Marcus decision sent the pendulum swinging too far in the
other direction. 57 This era is perhaps best exemplified by the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean. 58 In Dean, the State of Wisconsin brought charges against
Alice Dean, a medical doctor, for submitting false claims for
Medicaid reimbursements, and a state court found Dean guilty. 59
53. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
679–80 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that litigation “surged as opportunistic private
litigants chased after generous cash bounties and, unhindered by any effective
restrictions under the Act, often brought parasitic lawsuits copied from
preexisting indictments or based upon congressional investigations”).
54. Id. at 680.
55. See id. (noting that Congress “finally took action to prevent such piggyback lawsuits”).
56. Id. (citing Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608, recodified in 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded)).
57. See Todd J. Canni, Who’s Making False Claims, the Qui Tam Plaintiff
or the Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require That
All Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 7 (2007)
(“Where the original version of the FCA opened the door too wide, inviting all
types of speculative suits, Congress ultimately realized that the 1943
amendments effectively shut the door on qui tam suits.”).
58. See U.S. ex rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1106–07 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a state is not entitled to an exemption to the FCA’s requirements
even when the state is under an obligation to report information to the federal
government).
59. See id. at 1102 (“Defendant Alice R. Dean is a medical doctor who at
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Subsequently, the Wisconsin Departments of Justice and Health
and Social Services brought suit in federal district court against
Dean under the FCA. 60 The State of Wisconsin’s complaint
alleged that Dean had submitted approximately 912 fraudulent
claims for reimbursement over roughly a two-year period, and the
suit sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
costs. 61 The Seventh Circuit, after laying out the requirements for
qui tam actions under the FCA, noted that relators may maintain
a qui tam action—even though the government declines to join—
unless it appears that the relator’s suit is based upon evidence or
information the United States (or one of its agencies) already
possesses at the time the suit is brought. 62
The federal government declined to join the action, 63 and the
district court found that information about Dean’s fraudulent
claims was sufficiently in the government’s possession; the
federal government was already able to adequately investigate
the case and make a decision about whether to prosecute. 64 Yet
the district court, looking more toward the history and goals of
the FCA, interpreted the FCA as allowing Wisconsin’s action to
proceed. 65 In reaching this conclusion, the district court
“determined that the State of Wisconsin could maintain a qui tam
action when the State was the source of ‘essential information’
one time practiced psychiatry in the Milwaukee area. In 1980, the defendant
was found guilty in state court of making fraudulent claims for Medicaid
reimbursements in connection with her medical practice.”).
60. See id. (noting that the government “filed suit in federal district court
against the defendant under the False Claims Act”).
61. See id. (noting that the suit “alleged that the defendant submitted
approximately 912 fraudulent claims for reimbursement for psychiatric services
between March 1974 and February 1976” and demanded “compensatory
damages on a pendent claim, $150,000 punitive damages, and costs”).
62. See id. (noting that plaintiff “may maintain the action even though the
government declines to join unless ‘[it appears] that such suit was based upon
evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency,
officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought’”).
63. See id. (“The United States declined to join this action.”).
64. See id. at 1103 (noting that the district court “held that ‘the information
upon which the instant case is based was sufficiently in the possession of the
United States to enable the federal government to adequately investigate the
case and make a decision whether to prosecute’”).
65. See id. (noting that the court “interpreted the legislative history of
section 232(C) and denied [Dean’s] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction”).
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and when the State was required to provide such information to
the federal government as part of its participation in the
Medicare reimbursement program.” 66 The district court reasoned
that a contrary result would render the FCA ineffective. 67
The Seventh Circuit reversed. 68 The court agreed that the
federal government possessed adequate information as
contemplated by the FCA, 69 and thus any justification for
allowing the State’s qui tam action to proceed must be grounded
in an exception to the FCA’s plain language. 70 Substantiating
such an exception would require “a ‘clearly expressed legislative
intention’ contrary to that language.” 71 The district court
concluded that the legislative history of the FCA did justify such
an exception, but the Seventh Circuit sharply disagreed. 72 The
Seventh Circuit noted that the various courts which reviewed the
FCA’s legislative history since the jurisdictional bar was added in
1943 all refused to find an exception. 73 The court also pointed out
that while Congress’s immediate concern in enacting the 1943
amendment was to combat parasitic litigation, the language and
effect of the 1943 amendment was, in fact, much broader. 74
Further, the amendment itself was

66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See id. (noting that a contrary result would “frustrate the purpose of
Congress in protecting the United States against false claims”).
68. See id. (“We accepted jurisdiction and now reverse.”).
69. See id. at 1104 (noting that the “district court . . . properly determined
that the government possessed adequate information as contemplated by section
232(C)”).
70. See id. (describing a need for an “exception [that would] overcome the
plain language of the False Claims Act”).
71. Id. (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
72. See id. (noting that the district court “concluded that the legislative
history of the Act was clear enough to overcome the statute’s unambiguous
language” but that “[o]ur own review of the legislative history leads us to the
opposite conclusion”).
73. See id. (finding that reviewing courts “all held that no exception
exists”).
74. See id. (noting that while “Congress’s immediate concern in enacting
the 1943 amendment was to do away with the ‘parasitical suits’ allowed by
[Marcus], the language and effect of the 1943 amendment in fact is much
broader”).
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the result of a compromise between very different remedies
proposed in each House of Congress. The House of
Representatives passed a bill to completely abolish qui tam
suits. The Senate, on the other hand, sought to allow qui tam
actions if they were based either upon information not in the
possession of the United States or upon information in the
possession of the United States of which the qui tam plaintiff
was the source. The compromise amendment allowed qui tam
actions that the United States did not join to continue if the
information was not in the possession of the United States at
the time the action was brought, thereby incorporating only
the first part of the original Senate proposal. 75

In other words, while the 1943 amendment countered
parasitic lawsuits by establishing a jurisdictional bar for cases in
which the United States government already possessed the
information in question, the amendment provided no exception
for cases in which the qui tam relator was himself (or itself) the
original source of such information. Like the Supreme Court in
Marcus, 76 the Dean court handled the FCA very cautiously,
reasoning that only rarely should a court find an exception to a
statute when Congress has not explicitly provided one. 77 The
court refused to read the Social Security Act as providing an
exception to the FCA and insisted that if Wisconsin “desires a
special exemption to the False Claims Act because of its
requirement to report Medicaid fraud to the federal government,
then it should ask Congress to provide the exemption.” 78

75. Id. at 1104–05 (emphasis added).
76. It is interesting that in providing its holding, the Seventh Circuit in
fact cited Marcus. See id. at 1106–07 (“As the Supreme Court stated in United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess . . . when it refused to create the jurisdictional bar
that Congress later provided by the 1943 amendment to the False Claims
Act . . . .”).
77. See id. at 1106 (“Only in the rarest instance will a court find an
exception to a statute when Congress has not directly amended that statute.”)
(citing Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281, 288 (3d Cir.
1977)).
78. Id.
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D. Striking a Balance: The 1986 Amendments

In 1986, Congress provided such an exemption. 79 The 1986
amendments to the FCA included the “original source exception,”
which changed the FCA to read:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information. 80

If the 1943 amendment corrected decisions like Marcus, then
the 1986 changes sought to remedy decisions like Dean. 81
According to the Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee,
the amendments’ purpose was to strengthen the federal
government’s ability to detect and combat fraud. 82 The Senate
lamented the recent spate of fraud cases 83 and pointed out that
such a flood of fraudulent activity necessitated modernization of
the FCA. 84
The 1986 amendments sought not only to equip the
government with better tools but also to encourage individuals
with knowledge of fraud to alert the government. 85 In the face of
sophisticated and widespread fraud, the Committee believed that
“only a coordinated effort of both the government and the
citizenry [would] decrease this wave of defrauding public
79. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2011) (providing for civil actions
for false claims).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13 (1986) (referring to the “unfortunate
result of the Wisconsin v. Dean decision”).
82. See id. at 1 (describing a need “to enhance the Government’s ability to
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government”).
83. See id. at 2 (noting that “the recent proliferation of cases among some of
the largest Government contractors indicates that the problem is severe”).
84. See id. (noting that the “growing pervasiveness of fraud” necessitated
modernization of the FCA in order “to make the statute a more useful tool
against fraud in modern times”).
85. See id. (describing the amendments’ purpose “not only to provide the
Government’s law enforcers with more effective tools” but to “encourage any
individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information forward”).
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funds.” 86 As the First Circuit noted in United States ex rel.
Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, the 1986 amendments
sought to promote proper qui tam suits while discouraging
opportunistic, parasitic litigation. 87 The amendments repealed
the “government knowledge” jurisdictional bar and replaced it
with a provision that allows suits involving allegations of fraud
that are already public when the qui tam relator is an original
source of the information. 88 Ironically, the Findley court noted,
the 1986 amendments themselves have spawned new litigation
and even circuit splits over the meanings of the amendments’ key
terms, such as original source, direct and independent, and
information. 89 This Note turns next to the resulting circuit split
regarding the definition of original source.
III. Three-Way Circuit Split and Statutory Developments
After Congress enacted the 1986 amendments to the FCA, a
split developed among the United States Courts of Appeals over
the proper way to interpret the original source exception to the
FCA’s public disclosure bar for qui tam actions. 90 As will be
discussed below, the First and Fourth Circuits took what may be
termed the “permissive approach,” 91 while the Second and Ninth
Circuits took a much more restrictive approach. 92 In contrast to
both of these views, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits staked out a
86. Id.
87. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
680 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“After ricocheting between the . . . permissiveness that
preceded the 1943 amendments and the extreme restrictiveness that followed,
Congress . . . sought to achieve ‘the golden mean between adequate
incentives . . . and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs . . . .’”).
88. See id. at 681 (noting that the amendments “repealed the ‘government
knowledge’ jurisdictional bar” and allowed an exception when “the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information”).
89. See id. (noting that the amendments “have led to extensive litigation
and to circuit splits concerning the meaning of the words ‘based upon,’ ‘public
disclosure,’ ‘allegations or transactions,’ ‘original source,’ ‘direct and
independent knowledge’ and ‘information’”).
90. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 22
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010) (noting the circuit split).
91. See infra Part III.A (noting the permissive approach).
92. See infra Part III.B (discussing the restrictive view).
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middle ground. 93 Finally, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 94 altered the definition of original source under
the FCA. 95
A. Permissive Approach
In United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Products,
L.P., 96 the First Circuit considered a qui tam suit brought against
a pharmaceutical distributor, Ortho Biotech Products, L.P.
(OBP). 97 The qui tam relators alleged that OBP violated the FCA
in unlawfully promoting the sale of one of its drugs. 98 The
original complaint charged that OPC had fraudulently
manipulated the drug’s Average Wholesale Price 99 and used free
samples, rebates, and education grants to falsify their books. 100
Plaintiffs alleged that OBP used these tactics to lower the
providers’ net cost. 101
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the qui tam
relators appealed. 102 On appeal, OBP and the government argued
93. See infra Part III.C (examining the “middle ground” approach).
94. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 204–17 (discussing the new
amendments to the FCA).
96. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 21
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010) (finding that qui tam relator
qualified as an original source).
97. See id. at 16 (noting that relators “alleged that defendant-appellee
Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. (‘OBP’) violated the FCA in unlawfully promoting
the sale of its drug Procrit”).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 17 (discussing “allegations concerning OBP’s fraudulent
reporting of the Average Wholesale Price (‘AWP’) of [its drug] Procrit, a
benchmark used by the Medicare program for reimbursement purposes”).
100. See id. (“[The complaint] also alleged that OBP provided ‘free samples’
of Procrit as well as ‘non-public financial inducements,’ such as rebates,
discounts, ‘unrestricted education grants,’ and ‘phony drug studies.’”).
101. See id. (noting charges that OBP “further ‘inflate[d] the AWP,’ as ‘the
value of these services was kept off the book [sic], so as not [to] be reflected in
the AWP’”).
102. See id. at 19–20 (noting that “the district court allowed OBP’s motion to
dismiss with prejudice and entered judgment in OBP’s favor” and that as “no
claims survived, the district court dismissed the Amended Complaint with
prejudice as to the Relators.”).
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that the qui tam action should be dismissed under the FCA’s
public disclosure bar; OBP contended that the statute required
disclosure of the information to the government before the
information became public. 103 The First Circuit disagreed with
OBP. 104 The court rejected OBP’s contention that the FCA
requires an original source to provide his or her information
before the public disclosure at issue; instead, the court decided to
“honor the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute” and held
that § 3730(e)(4)(B) only requires that a relator provide his or her
information prior to the filing of the qui tam suit. 105 The First
Circuit began with settled rules of statutory interpretation and
considered whether the statute at issue was plain and
unambiguous. 106 To determine this, the court looked at the
language itself, as well as the immediate context and the statute
as a whole. 107 The court noted that a literal reading of the FCA
would only require relators to provide their information to the
government before filing suit 108 and that “the plain terms of [§]
3730(e)(4)(B) begin and end the matter.” 109 The court was not
persuaded by the government’s contention110 that the definition
of “source” in Black’s Law Dictionary should apply, and that this

103. See id. at 21 (noting the argument that “31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)
requires a relator to provide the information to the government before the public
disclosure itself, not just before the filing of the relator’s suit”).
104. See id. (“[W]e disagree, and conclude that the district court’s
interpretation is the correct one.”).
105. Id. at 28.
106. See id. at 22 (“Although we are about to travel a well-trodden path, our
first step remains the same. Our first step in interpreting a statute is to
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”).
107. See id. (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
108. See id. (“By its terms, the ‘original source’ exception only requires the
relator to ‘provide[ ] the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information.’ Section 3730(e)(4)(B) does
not impose any other timing requirement.”).
109. Id.
110. See id. (“The government argues that the language of § 3730(e)(4)(B),
when read in context, supports its view.”).

382

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365 (2012)

definition requires an original source under the FCA to
“originate” information. 111
The court refused to accept the government’s proffered
definition of original source when the FCA already defined the
term, 112 noting that it is only when a statute fails to define a term
that a court should fall back on the ordinary meaning. 113 The
court also refused to take into account Congress’s choice to use
the term original source rather than engraft the definition found
at § 3730(e)(4)(B) into (e)(4)(A). 114 The court reasoned that had
Congress wanted courts to use the plain meaning, it would have
done so explicitly. 115
The court pointed to the structure of the FCA and defended
its position against charges that it would encourage parasitic
lawsuits, noting that the “first-to-file rule” already incentivizes
whistleblowers not to delay their qui tam actions. 116 The goal of
the first-to-file rule is to provide qui tam relators an incentive to
alert the government to fraudulent activity quickly, lest another
relator steal their action’s legal thunder; the court saw no reason
to pile further restrictions onto qui tam actions. 117 According to
the First Circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell
International Corp. v. United States, 118 which interpreted the
111. See id. (“[T]he government points to the meaning of the terms ‘original
source’ itself, contending that a ‘source’ is defined as ‘[t]he originator or primary
agent of an act, circumstance, or result.’ . . . Thus, a source cannot ‘originat[e]’
information that has been publicly disclosed.”).
112. See id. (declining to “rely upon the plain meaning of the terms ‘original
source’ when the statute defines the term at § 3730(e)(4)(B)”).
113. See id. at 22–23 (“It is only ‘[w]hen a word is not defined by statute’
that we ‘construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.’”).
114. See id. at 23 (declining to “attribute significance to Congress’s use of
the terms ‘original source’ rather than engraft the definition found at
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) into § 3730(e)(4)(A)”).
115. See id. (“Finally, had Congress intended to retain the plain meaning of
‘original source’ and require relators to provide their information prior to the
public disclosure, ‘it easily could have done so.’”).
116. See id. at 24 (noting that the rule “already provides potential relators
significant incentive not to sit on the sidelines”).
117. See id. (“It is unclear why a relator would wait for a public disclosure
and risk another relator bringing suit.”).
118. See Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007)
(holding that the relator “did not have direct and independent knowledge of the
information upon which his allegations were based”).
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FCA’s “direct and independent” knowledge requirement,
undercut the government’s argument 119 because in addressing
the meaning of the FCA’s direct and independent knowledge
requirement, the Supreme Court also addressed the term
information, holding that the term refers to the information
behind the relator’s claim, not the information behind the public
disclosure. 120
The First Circuit also held that the FCA’s tumultuous history
supported its position. 121 Congress had amended the FCA
specifically to encourage more private qui tam actions, noting
that such actions may be useful and lucrative even when certain
allegations of fraud have already been made public. 122 The 1986
amendments, after all, were designed to remedy the extreme
restrictiveness of the Dean decision. 123 The First Circuit rejected
any reading of the FCA that would discourage productive
whistleblower suits from proceeding, even if such permissiveness
allowed a few parasitic qui tam actions to creep into the docket. 124
The First Circuit feared that the reading suggested by OBP and
the government (as well as by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits) would

119. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 24
(1st Cir. 2009) (stating that Rockwell “substantially undercuts the conclusion by
the D.C. and Sixth Circuits that ‘little incentive’ is necessary for suits brought
after a public disclosure”).
120. See id. (“[T]he Rockwell Court . . . addressed the meaning of the term
‘information’ . . . [and held] that ‘information’ for purposes of both
subparagraphs refers to the ‘information underlying the allegations of the
relator’s action,’ not the information underlying the public disclosure.” (emphasis
added)).
121. See id. at 27 (noting that “the 1986 amendments equally sought to end
a regime that resulted in the ‘under-enforcement’ of the FCA, one that rested too
much on government notice to prevent fraud”).
122. See id. (noting that there “may arise situations when . . . the
government would benefit from suits brought by relators with substantial
information of government fraud even though the outlines of the fraud are in
the public domain”).
123. See id. at 26 (noting that the Dean court held that if relators want a
special exemption to the FCA’s public disclosure bar, they “should ask Congress
to provide that exemption” and that “Congress obliged, and in 1986 Congress
amended the FCA to ‘encourage more private enforcement suits’”).
124. See id. at 27 ( “[W]e have rejected readings of the ‘public disclosure’ bar
that ‘would create a new exclusion not articulated in the text’ which would
discourage ‘productive private enforcement.’”).
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jeopardize the 1986 amendments and return the courts to the
government-knowledge bar of the Dean era. 125
In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 126
the Fourth Circuit articulated a similar position, stating that a
relator “having direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations in the public disclosure is
based” need only “provide his information to the government
before instituting his qui tam action, as the provision
unambiguously states.” 127 In Siller, the qui tam plaintiff alleged
that a medical device distributor defrauded the government, and
the plaintiff filed an action in 1991, 128 but not before similar
charges came to light in another case. 129 The district court held
that Siller did not qualify as an original source. 130 The Fourth
Circuit, however, rejected this approach, 131 holding that such an
outlook rested on a misreading of the FCA’s legislative history. 132
The Fourth Circuit viewed the Second Circuit’s reading of the
FCA’s text and legislative history as “not merely unpersuasive,
125. See id. (“[W]e rejected an interpretation . . . [that included disclosures
made only to the government], as it would ‘reinstate exactly what Congress
eliminated . . . .’ Although the reading urged here would not return us to the
‘government notice’ regime, it [would bar] ‘productive private enforcement
suits.’” (citation omitted)).
126. See U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that “a qui tam plaintiff need not be a source to the
entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which the qui tam action is
based in order to be an original source under section 3730(e)(4)(B)”).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1341 (“David Siller filed the instant qui tam suit against BD
in January 1991. According to Siller, [Siller] originally learned that BD
overcharged the government through his employment with SSI, not as a result
of SSI’s suit against BD.”).
129. See id. (“In 1989, SSI filed suit against BD. . . . The thrust of [the]
complaint was that BD canceled SSI’s distributorship because it feared that
SSI . . . would disclose that BD was overcharging the government.”).
130. See id. at 1351 (noting that “Siller was not an ‘original source’ within
section 3730(e)(4)’s exception to its jurisdictional bar”).
131. See id. (“We reject the Second Circuit’s standard, and the district
court’s adoption of that standard, as imposing an additional, extra-textual
requirement that was not intended by Congress.”).
132. See id. at 1352 (“We believe that, in truth, the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that a putative plaintiff must provide his information to the
disclosing entity in order to be an original source rests not upon the statutory
language, but entirely upon a reading, and misreading, of the legislative
history.”).
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but implausible.” 133 The court held that the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of § 3730(e)(4) of the FCA, which read the FCA as
requiring the plaintiff to provide his information to the disclosing
entity, is foreclosed by the definition of original source in
subparagraph (B). 134
The Fourth Circuit found the Second Circuit’s view to be not
only a misreading of the FCA’s legislative history but also a
misuse of this history to read ambiguity where no ambiguity
existed. 135 The Second Circuit relied heavily on comments by
Senator Grassley during the debate over the 1986 amendments,
and if the enacted language had matched the proposed language
at the time of Senator Grassley’s comments, the Second Circuit
might have a point. 136 Yet the version of the amendments on
which Senator Grassley commented was later changed in two
significant respects. 137 First, the requirement that an original
source under the FCA inform the media was dropped from the
amendments’ final language; given that the media is specified in
other parts of the final language, the fact that Congress deleted
the words “the media” from the original source requirements is
instructive. 138 Second, the amendments ultimately required only
that an original source had to inform the government “before
filing” an action—not before the government filed an action. 139
133. Id. at 1351.
134. See id. (“The Second Circuit’s interpretation . . . might at least be
tenable were there not a definition of ‘original source’ in sub-paragraph (B). . . .
Sub-paragraph (B) . . . sets forth [what] the Second Circuit holds it does
not . . . .”).
135. See id. at 1352 (“In fact, the Second Circuit’s decision is a classic
example of the use of legislative history to create an ambiguity in the statute
where none exists in order to justify use of that history as dispositive evidence of
congressional intent.”).
136. See id. at 1353 (“If the provision . . . had been enacted as it existed at
the time Senator Grassley made the comment, the comment would be some
evidence of a congressional intent supporting the Second Circuit’s
interpretation, although even then we would not permit [it] to override [clear]
statutory language . . . .”).
137. See id. (“In fact, however, the version of the legislation addressed by
Senator Grassley was changed in two significant respects.” (footnote omitted)).
138. See id. (noting that “Congress deleted ‘the media’ as a party whom the
original source was required to inform” and that “Congress presumably would
not have deleted the media from the ‘original source’ definition . . . if it intended
to require the plaintiff to provide his information to the disclosing entity”).
139. See id. (“Second, Congress ultimately provided that an original source
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Indeed, if Congress had intended relators to be a source to the
disclosing entity, Congress would not have allowed relators to
provide their information after the public disclosure. 140 These
changes in language from the amendments’ proposed language to
their final form suggest that, even if Congress had considered
requiring relators to be a source to the disclosing entity in order
to qualify as an original source, Congress ultimately chose not to
codify such a requirement. 141 In sum, then, according to the First
and Fourth Circuits, qui tam relators must voluntarily provide
their information to the government only before filing their
actions; no other timing requirements apply.
B. Restrictive Approach
The Second Circuit also weighed in on the debate. In United
States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 142 the Second
Circuit considered a qui tam action brought by managers of a
nuclear power plant. 143 The managers filed an action under the
FCA, 144 charging that the Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO) had
deceived the state’s Public Service Commission about the plant’s
construction status, essentially cheating the government. 145
had to inform the government only ‘before filing [his qui tam] action,’ as opposed
to ‘prior to an action filed by the Government.’”).
140. See id. (“It would be odd, if Congress had intended a plaintiff to be a
source to the disclosing entity in order to be an ‘original source,’ for it to have
allowed the plaintiff to provide his information after the public disclosure . . . .”).
141. See id. (“These two changes suggest that, even assuming that Congress
may at one point have intended a plaintiff to be a source to the disclosing entity
to be an original source, which is anything but clear, it ultimately chose not to
enact such a requirement into law.”).
142. See U.S. ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that “if the information on which a qui tam suit is based is in
the public domain, and the qui tam plaintiff was not a source of that
information, then the suit is barred”).
143. See id. at 14 (noting an action by “mid-level managers at the Shoreham
Nuclear Power Station”).
144. See id. (noting that the managers “were aware of the construction
status of Shoreham” and that “they filed a complaint against the Long Island
Lighting Co. (‘LILCO’), certain of its executives (collectively, the ‘LILCO
defendants’), and Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.”).
145. See id. (discussing deception about the “construction status of
Shoreham” and LILCO’s allegedly obtaining “higher rates and defrauding the
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However, almost sixteen months earlier, New York’s Suffolk
County had filed an action against LILCO for violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 146
and this RICO action had garnered significant publicity. 147
The court noted that, while the appellants’ later-filed
complaint included some new factual allegations, on the whole
the complaint “was fairly characterized by the district judge as a
copy of [Suffolk County’s] earlier complaint.” 148 The court
disagreed that relators were original sources, reasoning that in
addition to voluntarily providing their information to the
government before filing their actions, true original sources must
also be a source of the initial leak. 149 The court based this
conclusion on a close reading of the text and its legislative
history. 150 The court also noted that the purpose of the FCA “is to
encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud being
perpetrated against the government to bring such information
forward,” 151 and reasoned that its interpretation harmonized with
this purpose and was “most likely to bring ‘wrongdoing to light’
since, by barring those who come forward only after public
disclosure of possible [FCA] violations from acting as qui tam
plaintiffs, it discourages persons with relevant information from
remaining silent and encourages them to report such information
at the earliest possible time.” 152
Like the First Circuit in Duxbury, the Second Circuit began
with the FCA’s legislative history, stating that the court’s role is
United States as a ratepayer”).
146. See id. (noting that the county “had commenced a putative class action
against the LILCO defendants, alleging in its complaint violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act . . . leading to the rate
overcharges” (citation omitted)).
147. See id. (noting that the action “was widely reported in the news media,
especially in the Counties of Nassau and Suffolk”).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 16 (finding that “there is an additional requirement that a qui
tam plaintiff must meet in order to be considered an ‘original source,’ namely, a
plaintiff also must have directly or indirectly been a source to the entity that
publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is based”).
150. See id. (describing a “close textual analysis combined with a review of
the legislative history”).
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id.
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to discern congressional intent. 153 The court noted that two
legislators—both heavily involved in the passage of the 1986
amendments—had spoken at length regarding the meaning of the
term original source. 154 Representative Berman, a codrafter of the
legislation, defined an original source as someone who “had some
of the information related to the claim which he made available
to the government or the news media in advance of the false
claims being publicly disclosed.” 155 In the same vein, Senator
Grassley, who introduced the legislation in the Senate, stated
that the FCA barred a relator who had not been a source to the
entity that disclosed the allegations. 156
The Second Circuit noted that if § 3730(e)(4)(B) contained the
exclusive requirements that a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy to be
an original source, Senator Grassley’s and Representative
Berman’s statements would make little sense. 157 However, if
subsection (4)(A) is construed to hold an additional requirement
that a relator must meet to be considered an original source,
namely, that the relator must have been a source to the entity
that first leaked or disclosed the allegations of fraud, the
legislative history is more coherent. 158 In short, the Second
Circuit found that, for cases in which allegations of fraud are in
the public domain, and the qui tam plaintiff is not a source of
such information, then the plaintiff’s suit is barred. 159
153. See id. at 17 (noting that “our fundamental task in interpreting a
statute is ‘to give effect to the intent of Congress’” and that “we look to the
legislative history for evidence of Congress’s intent” (citing United States v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940))).
154. See id. (“Two legislators who appear to have been the most involved
with the Act’s development and passage spoke at length regarding the meaning
of ‘original source.’”).
155. Id. (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)).
156. See id. (noting that a relator would be barred “‘who had not been an
original source to the entity that disclosed the allegations’ from bringing a qui
tam claim based on publicly disclosed information”).
157. See id. (noting that if (4)(B) “contained the exclusive requirements that
a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy to be an ‘original source,’ these legislators’
statements would be somewhat inexplicable”).
158. See id. (noting that legislative history makes “much [more] sense if
[paragraph] (4)(A) contains an additional requirement . . . namely, that to be
considered an ‘original source,’ one must have been a source to the entity that
first publicly disclosed the information on which a suit is based”).
159. See id. at 18 (“In sum, for the reasons stated hereinabove, we believe
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The Ninth Circuit cited Dick and articulated the same
approach in Wang v. FMC Corp. 160 Wang is very similar to Dick;
both cases come to the same conclusion. The plaintiff in Wang
was fired from his job at the FMC Corporation, a defense
contractor, and later filed several claims. 161 Among these claims
was a qui tam action alleging that the corporation had defrauded
the government. 162 The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit,
relied on legislative history and found that the FCA extends qui
tam jurisdiction only to those who had participated in the public
disclosure of the allegations in the first place. 163 The court also
considered public policy, noting that the paradigmatic qui tam
plaintiff is the “whistleblowing insider.” 164 Qui tam suits are
meant to encourage those with inside information to blow the
whistle on fraudulent practices, and “[i]n such a scheme, there is
little point in rewarding a second toot.” 165 Since Wang, like Dick,
was not a true original source, Wang was forced to withdraw from
the action. 166
To put it another way, if a plaintiff simply republishes
charges that are already in the public domain, the Second and
Ninth Circuits barred such a relator from bringing a qui tam
action. 167 The court made its point forcibly: “A ‘whistleblower’
that if the information on which a qui tam suit is based is in the public domain,
and the qui tam plaintiff was not a source of that information, then the suit is
barred.”).
160. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that “[b]ecause he had no hand in the original public disclosure of [fraud],
Wang’s claim . . . is blocked by the jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4)(A)”).
161. See id. at 1415 (“Wang was fired from his job at FMC on December 11,
1986. He filed this action a year later, on December 10, 1987. In addition to his
False Claims Act claim, Wang joined a number of state law claims, including a
wrongful termination claim.”).
162. See id. (noting Wang’s allegation that “FMC defrauded the Government
in four separate projects”).
163. See id. at 1418 (relying on the “history of the False Claims Act and the
legislative history of its most recent amendment make clear that qui tam
jurisdiction was meant to extend only to those who had played a part in publicly
disclosing the allegations and information on which their suits were based”).
164. Id. at 1419.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1418.
167. See id. at 1419 (finding that such relator “cannot bring a qui tam suit,
even if he had ‘direct and independent knowledge’ of the fraud”).
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sounds the alarm; he does not echo it.” 168 Public policy also
dictates that plaintiffs should be incentivized to reveal fraud; the
government’s goal is to reward those who bring wrongdoing to
light, and any bounty that results from such action should go to
those relators. 169
C. Middle-Ground Approach
In contrast to the view of the First and Fourth Circuits—
which allowed qui tam plaintiffs to proceed as long as they
voluntarily provided their information to the government before
filing their actions—and the view of the Second and Ninth
Circuits—which barred qui tam suits in which the plaintiff was
not the source of any public disclosure—the D.C. and Sixth
Circuits carved out a third option. 170
In United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’
Club, 171 the qui tam relator alleged that government employees’
clubs, which earned revenue from vending services, kept money
owed to the government. 172 The district court, however, found
that the same fraudulent practice of government employees’ clubs
retaining vending machine income was widely known at the time
the action was brought, and the court dismissed the case in
168. Id.
169. See id. at 1420 (“While Wang was silent, some other conscientious or
enterprising person bravely brought the transmission problems to the attention
of the media and the Army. If there is to be a bounty for disclosing those
troubles, it should go to one who in fact helped to bring them to light.”).
170. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot qualify as an
‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the essential elements of
the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to their public disclosure”);
U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with the
information prior to any public disclosure”).
171. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691 (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot
qualify as an ‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the
essential elements of the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to
their public disclosure”).
172. See id. at 678 (discussing allegations that “government employees’
clubs that earn revenue from vending services on federal property [were]
violating the False Claims Act . . . by retaining monies owed to the
government”).
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reliance on the FCA’s jurisdictional bar. 173 The D.C. Circuit,
using the language, structure, history, and purpose of the FCA,
concluded that the FCA’s public disclosure bar should only allow
suits in which the relator played a role in making new
discoveries; since Findley was not such a relator, the court held
that his suit was barred. 174
The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the
strict approach articulated by the Second Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit. 175 To qualify as an original source, a relator must simply
have provided information to the government before filing the
suit. 176 The court added that “the statute only contemplates an
‘original source’ being a ‘source’ to the government.” 177 A person
who provided information to the government should be able to
bring his suit; it should not matter that the relator’s information
was subsequently uncovered by, for example, the news media. 178
Yet the D.C. Circuit differed from the Fourth Circuit in one
key respect, finding that a true original source must, essentially,
outrace the public disclosure. 179 The court conceded that
subparagraph (B), considered in isolation, seems to imply that an
original source need only have direct and independent knowledge;
the court, however insisted that subparagraphs (A) and (B) must
be read in conjunction. 180 The court found it significant that
173. See id. (“[T]he practice of government employees’ clubs retaining
vending machine income was widely known at the time this action was brought
and dismissed the case in reliance on the Act’s jurisdictional bar against qui tam
suits that are ‘based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions . . . .’”).
174. See id. (“[T]he public disclosure bar . . . limits qui tam jurisdiction to
those cases in which the relator played a role in exposing a fraud of which the
public was previously unaware.”).
175. See id. at 690 (“[T]here is no additional requirement that the ‘original
source’ be responsible for providing the information to the entity that publicly
disclosed the allegations of fraud.”).
176. See id. (noting that relator must have “‘voluntarily provided the
information to the government’ before filing a qui tam suit”).
177. Id.
178. See id. (“A person who provided information to the government that
subsequently was uncovered by a reporter and printed in the newspaper, would
still be able to maintain a qui tam action.”).
179. See id. (noting that relator “must provide the government with the
information prior to any public disclosure”).
180. See id. (“Standing on its own, subparagraph (B) suggests that an
‘original source’ need only have direct and independent knowledge of the
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Congress chose to use the term original source rather than
incorporate subparagraph (B)’s description into subparagraph
(A); the court reasoned that this choice reflected a requirement
that an original source provide the information to the government
before the information becomes public. 181 “Once the information
has been publicly disclosed,” the D.C. Circuit reasoned, “there is
little need for the incentive provided by a qui tam action.” 182 In
Findley’s case, the relator conceded that he did not know about
the public disclosures of fraud but rather learned of the practices
of the FPC-Boron Employees’ Club at a later date. 183 Because the
fraudulent schemes that Findley observed were made public
before Findley even knew of them, the court found that Findley
could not qualify as an original source. 184
The qui tam relator in United States ex rel. McKenzie v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 185 was an employee of South
Central Bell, a BellSouth subsidiary, who became concerned that
her employer was defrauding the government by falsifying repair
information for telephone lines used by BellSouth’s government
customers. 186 McKenzie did not sit passively by; she complained
allegations in the qui tam complaint. The two subparagraphs must be read
together, however, in order to divine Congress’ real intent.”).
181. See id. at 691 (“[T]he only reading of the statute that accounts for . . .
Congress’ decision to use the term ‘original source’ rather than simply
incorporating subparagraph (B)’s description . . . is one that requires an original
source to provide the information to the government prior to any public
disclosure.”).
182. Id.
183. See id. (“[Relator] stated that he was unaware of the public disclosures
that we relied on in determining that the jurisdictional bar has been triggered
and that he learned of the practices of the FPC-Boron Employees’ Club [at a
later date].”).
184. See id. (finding that because the “employees’ groups’ questionable
transactions were publicly disclosed . . . before Findley even became aware of
the practices, he cannot qualify as an original source who is exposing essential
elements of a fraudulent transaction that have not previously been publicly
disclosed”).
185. See U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935,
943 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with
the information prior to any public disclosure”).
186. See id. at 937 (noting that “McKenzie was an employee of BellSouth’s
subsidiary, South Central Bell, from December 1966 until March 1992,” and
that according to McKenzie’s complaint, “South Central Bell, to avoid having to
make refunds to the United States and other customers, falsified trouble
reports”).
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to her supervisors about these practices in 1984 and continued to
complain until she left the company. 187 After bringing her
concerns to light, McKenzie felt harassed and claimed that the
company threatened to dismiss her. 188 After McKenzie suffered
two emotional breakdowns, a company psychiatrist placed
McKenzie on leave, prompting McKenzie to bring suit. 189 The
district court, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. 190
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal with an eye toward
whether the FCA, particularly the 1986 amendments, justified
jurisdiction over McKenzie’s suit. 191 The district court, noting
that McKenzie’s allegations were based upon public disclosures,
found that she would need to qualify as an original source in
order to proceed. 192 After reviewing the approaches of other
circuits, including the position offered by the D.C. Circuit in
Findley, the court noted that a plaintiff cannot “be a ‘true
whistleblower’ unless she is responsible for alerting the
government to the alleged fraud before such information is in the
public domain.” 193 The court then adopted the approach of the
D.C. Circuit and concluded that to be an original source, a relator
must bring fraud to the government’s attention before knowledge
of the fraud has been publicly disclosed. 194
The Sixth Circuit reached its conclusion by examining
congressional purpose, as well as the plain meaning of the
187. See id. (noting that McKenzie “began complaining to her supervisors at
South Central Bell about these practices in 1984 and continued to complain
until she left her position on disability status”).
188. See id. (noting that relator claimed to have been “threatened with
discharge”).
189. See id. (noting that “a company psychiatrist placed McKenzie on
permanent disability leave” and that McKenzie “filed suit under the FCA”).
190. See id. (noting that the district court “dismissed McKenzie’s complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FCA”).
191. See id. at 938 (noting that the court examined “whether the 1986
amendments [to the FCA] extend jurisdiction to include McKenzie’s suit”).
192. See id. at 941 (noting that the court “determined that McKenzie’s
allegations were based upon public disclosures” and so she “must have been an
‘original source’ for the district court to have jurisdiction over her action”).
193. Id. at 942.
194. See id. (“[T]o be an original source, a relator must inform the
government of the alleged fraud before the information has been publicly
disclosed.”).
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FCA. 195 The court considered the FCA’s history prior to the 1986
amendments and noted the two extremes of Marcus and Dean to
which judicial interpretations of the FCA had swung. 196 The
Sixth Circuit believed its interpretation of the phrase original
source was consistent with the FCA’s purpose and more likely
than other views to expose new allegations of fraud because, by
barring relators who file after a public disclosure, the Sixth
Circuit’s view would discourage potential relators from keeping
quiet. 197 The court also reasoned that its approach furthered
another goal of the FCA—preventing parasitic qui tam actions. 198
The Sixth Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit, wanted to reward the
true whistleblower, not the plaintiff who watches others make
allegations of fraud and then attempts to cash in on the
information. 199 To reward such a plaintiff, said the court, would
fly in the face of the FCA’s purpose. 200
Applying this analysis to McKenzie’s case, the court refused
to find that McKenzie was an original source; her complaint was
filed three years after identical allegations became public. 201
McKenzie was “not a ‘true whistleblower’ and [could not] benefit
195. See id. (“We reach this conclusion based on Congress’s purpose in
amending the Act and the plain meaning of the Act.”).
196. See id. (“[J]urisdiction under the FCA had experienced two extremes:
The original statute which allowed suits to proceed even though they had been
copied from federal indictments, and the 1943 amendments to the Act, which
precluded all suits in which the government already had knowledge of the
fraud . . . .”).
197. See id. at 943 (“The interpretation . . . adopted by this Court today is
consistent with this goal and ‘is most likely to bring “wrongdoing to light” since,
by barring those who come forward only after public disclosure . . . it
discourages persons with relevant information from remaining silent . . . .’”).
198. See id. (“At the same time, this approach furthers Congress’s second
goal in amending the FCA: ‘[T]o prevent “parasitic” qui tam actions in which
relators, rather than bringing to light independently discovered information of
fraud, simply feed off of previous disclosures of government fraud.’”).
199. See id. (“Anyone who alerts the government and is a ‘true
whistleblower’ deserves any reward that may be obtained by pursuing a qui tam
action under the FCA. However, the individual who sits on the sidelines . . .
should not be able to participate in any award.”).
200. See id. (“This would be contrary to the purpose of the statute.”).
201. See id. (“[I]t is clear that McKenzie is not an ‘original source.’ Her
complaint was filed three years after Falsetti and well after the allegations in
Dorris were made public. She was not the first to inform the government of the
alleged fraud.”).
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as if she were one.” 202 Thus, the approach of the D.C. and Sixth
Circuits, while not so restrictive as to require qui tam relators to
be the source of any public disclosure, still required relators to
inform the government before filing their actions and before the
allegations became publicly disclosed. 203
D. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). 204 While the
PPACA’s health care provisions garnered much attention, the
PPACA, in a much less publicized section, also altered the
definition of original source under the FCA. The new definition,
in context, reads as follows:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this
section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially
the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or
claim were publicly disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil,
or administrative hearing in which the Government or its
agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional, Government
Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit,
or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under
subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the
Government the information on which allegations or
transactions in a claim are based, or (ii) who has knowledge
that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily

202. Id.
203. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot qualify as an
‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the essential elements of
the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to their public disclosure”);
U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with the
information prior to any public disclosure”).
204. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system).
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provided the information to the Government before filing an
action under this section. 205

The PPACA, then, changed the definition of the term original
source to a relator who meets either prong of a dichotomy: (1) The
relator has voluntarily disclosed his or her information to the
government “prior to a public disclosure”; or (2) The relator has
independent knowledge that “materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations.” 206
Unfortunately, no legislative history for this portion of the
PPACA is available, leaving courts to wonder as to Congress’s
intent in changing the original source definition. Further, due to
the recent passage of the Act, courts have had little time to
consider the nuances of the new definition. The approximately
eleven federal qui tam cases decided since the adoption of the Act
either address different aspects of the changes 207 or expressly
decline to apply the changes because the PPACA made no
mention of retroactivity. 208
The developments described above leave the courts with
questions about how to interpret the new amendments to the
FCA in light of how they have previously construed the statute.
Unfortunately, the paucity of legislative history for the 2010
amendments makes this task difficult. Though the 2010
amendments contain ambiguities, it is clear that the new
205. Id. at 901–02 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3730 (West 2011)).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 773,
781 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting “changes effected by the 2010 amendments to the
FCA” relating to the “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing” element of the
statute).
208. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 392 F. App’x.
524, 526 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the parties “briefed these developments
after argument, and they agree that the PPACA’s statutory amendments should
not be applied retroactively to this case”); U.S. ex rel. Rosner v. WB/Stellar IP
Owner, L.L.C., 739 F. Supp. 2d 396, 402 n.56 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the
Supreme Court held that “these amendments do not apply retroactively to cases
pending at the time of the amendments”); U.S. ex rel. Dekort v. Integrated Coast
Guard Sys., 705 F. Supp. 2d 519, 553 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Given that the
legislation makes no mention of retroactivity, this Court . . . will ‘use the present
tense in discussing the statute as it existed at the time the case was argued.’”);
U.S. Dept. of Transp. ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, 745 F. Supp. 2d 637, 643 n.5
(W.D. Pa. 2010) (“The amendment was not made retroactive; therefore, the new
statutory language will not be addressed.”).
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language rejects the restrictive interpretation of the phrase
original source adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits. The
new language makes no mention of a relator’s need to be a source
to a disclosing entity, confirming the D.C. Circuit’s view that an
original source need only be a source to the government. 209 Under
both prongs of the new definition of original source, the relator
must simply “voluntarily disclose[] to the Government the
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are
based.” 210 This clarification is a positive change because the
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit approach would have restricted
many potentially beneficial qui tam suits. 211 A major goal of the
1986 amendments was to find a balance between the extremes of
the Marcus and Dean decisions, 212 and the new language
carefully avoids taking the restrictive approach of the Second and
Ninth Circuits. In light of the three-way circuit split, if Congress
had intended to give credence to this approach it could easily
have defined an original source as a source to the disclosing
entity; Congress’s refusal to do so is instructive. 213
It also seems clear that the “middle ground” approach
articulated by the D.C. Circuit receives at least some favorable
treatment: The first prong of the new definition states that an
“‘original source’ means an individual who . . . prior to a public
disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to
the Government the information on which allegations or

209. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
690 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Significantly, the statute only contemplates an ‘original
source’ being a ‘source’ to the government.”).
210. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 901–02 (2010) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B)
(West 2011)).
211. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 27
(1st Cir. 2009) (noting that “there . . . may arise situations when . . . the
government would benefit from suits brought by relators with substantial
information of government fraud even though the outlines of the fraud are in
the public domain”).
212. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 680 (“After ricocheting between the . . .
permissiveness that preceded the 1943 amendments and the extreme
restrictiveness that followed, Congress . . . sought to achieve ‘the golden mean
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely
valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs . . . .’”).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 136–41.
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transactions in a claim are based . . . .” 214 As noted previously, the
D.C. Circuit in Findley read into the FCA a requirement that an
original source provide the information to the government before
the information becomes public. 215 “Once the information has
been publicly disclosed,” the D.C. Circuit reasoned, “there is little
need for the incentive provided by a qui tam action.” 216 The first
prong of the new definition, in incorporating this requirement,
takes a needed step in screening out parasitic litigation.
It can be argued, however, that the definition’s second prong,
which adds, “or . . . who has knowledge that is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section,” 217 is
unclear and potentially weakens the positive step taken by the
first prong. The next section will consider this ambiguity.
IV. Combating Fraud Under the 2010 Amendments
This Part will consider what remains unclear under the
PPACA and how courts should proceed; specifically, this Part will
look to the legislative history of the proposed False Claims
Correction Act of 2009 for relevant indications of congressional
intent. 218 Next, this Part will review policy concerns undergirding
the FCA’s mission and consider empirical studies of both federal
and state qui tam actions. 219

214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691 (“[T]he only reading of the statute that
accounts for . . . Congress’ decision to use the term ‘original source’ rather than
simply incorporating subparagraph (B)’s description . . . is one that requires an
original source to provide the information to the government prior to any public
disclosure.”).
216. Id.
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 902 (2010) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2011)).
218. See infra text accompanying notes 220–43 (discussing the bill’s
legislative history).
219. See infra text accompanying notes 244–59 (discussing empirical
evidence for frivolous qui tam actions).
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A. Resolving Ambiguities
While the first prong of the new definition laudably
incorporates the D.C. and Sixth Circuit’s requirement that
relators provide their information to the government before any
public disclosure occurs, the definition’s second prong is unclear.
The PPACA uses phrases like “independent [knowledge]” and
“materially adds to” without defining these terms. Because of this
lack of definition, as well as the scarcity of legislative history
behind these provisions of the PPACA, it may be helpful to
consider the history of the False Claims Correction Act of 2009
(H.R. 1788) 220 for guidance. H.R. 1788 is relevant because it
represents the most recent window into the mind of Congress
with regard to the FCA; from it we can discern the weight
Congress places on avoiding parasitic litigation.
Though H.R. 1788 was never enacted, the House Committee
on the Judiciary compiled a Report on the bill. 221 While the
Report did not specifically address the “original source” exception,
it did deal with the public disclosure bar. 222 H.R. 1788’s
supporters sought to clarify the FCA and strike the proper
balance between incentivizing whistleblowers and discouraging
parasitic lawsuits. 223 The bill would have barred only actions
where all the essential elements of the qui tam suit stem from a
disclosure that has been “made on the public record or broadly
disseminated to the general public.” 224 Further, the bill would
have allowed only the government, not defendants, to invoke the
FCA’s public disclosure bar. 225
H.R. 1788 did not specifically address the original source
controversy. Nevertheless, the Committee’s Report, particularly
220. See False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong.
(2009) (proposing amendments to the False Claims Act).
221. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-97 (2009) (reporting on the bill and
recommending passage).
222. See id. at 14 (discussing proposed changes to the public disclosure bar).
223. See id. (“This clarifying language should return the meaning of the
public disclosure bar to what Congress intended in the 1986 amendments, while
still preventing truly parasitic suits.”).
224. Id.
225. See id. (noting that H.R. 1788 “provides that only the Government, and
not a defendant, may move to dismiss an action based on the public disclosure
bar”).
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the dissenting views, is still helpful due to its discussion of
parasitic lawsuits. The views of the bill’s opponents are useful
because—since H.R. 1788 did not pass—these views ultimately
carried the day. H.R. 1788’s opponents were concerned that the
bill went too far in its goal of “streamlining” qui tam actions, and
that while the bill contained useful elements, it also harbored
significant problems. 226 For instance, many of H.R. 1788’s
provisions focused on helping private qui tam plaintiffs without
necessarily benefiting U.S. taxpayers. 227
The bill’s opponents noted that increased litigation under the
FCA would not necessarily lead to greater recoveries. 228
Particularly important is the fact that the United States
government has declined to intervene in approximately 80% of
qui tam actions. 229 In fact, of “the $21.5 billion in FCA recoveries
since 1986, only three percent was recovered in qui tam cases in
which the Department of Justice declined to intervene.” 230 To put
it another way, weakening the public disclosure bar would not
save the government any money but rather would only benefit
opportunistic plaintiffs. 231
H.R. 1788’s opponents also pointed out that the increased
burden on the courts and the Justice Department
counterbalances plaintiffs’ interests in recovery under the FCA. 232
226. See id. at 28 (“Although some of the provisions in this bill may be
beneficial, other provisions are highly problematic.”).
227. See id. (noting that “the remaining sections of the bill are generally
aimed at helping private qui tam plaintiffs and the qui tam plaintiffs’ bar
without, in some instances, obvious benefits to the United States and the
taxpayers”).
228. See id. (“What is more, it is entirely unclear that an increased number
of qui tam cases will lead to increased recoveries under the FCA.” (emphasis
added)).
229. See id. (“The Federal Government investigates every qui tam filing and
has consistently declined to intervene in about 80% of the cases filed by private
plaintiffs. This selectivity is indicative of genuine discernment.”).
230. Id.
231. See id. (“[I]t is suspect that the qui tam provisions in this bill will
increase the Federal Government’s ability to recover taxpayer dollars. Rather, it
is possible that these provisions will encourage private plaintiffs to file
unfounded and parasitic lawsuits that benefit no one but the plaintiffs and their
attorneys.”).
232. See id. (noting that “additional suits will add to the Justice
Department’s burden and detract from its ability to focus on meaningful cases”
and that “the qui tam provisions in this bill may, in fact, be counterproductive”).
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The FCA is about balance between competing interests, and
simply increasing the number and availability of qui tam actions
does not necessarily strike this balance. 233 Further, achieving the
golden mean involves encouraging those whistleblowers with
genuinely valuable information while discouraging those who
have no significant information to contribute. 234 The idea is to
reward only those who “are truly deserving—whistleblowers who
bring information regarding fraud to light.” 235 The opponents of
H.R. 1788 noted that the bill would essentially eviscerate the
public disclosure bar. 236 The Justice Department, in particular,
expressed concern that plaintiffs with no direct knowledge of
fraud would seek to cash in on FCA litigation while providing no
real benefit to the government. 237 Relators could take money
away from taxpayers while contributing essentially nothing to the
government’s case. 238
The Committee Report not only shows Congress and the
Justice Department’s concern with preventing parasitic litigation,
but the opponents’ language is highly persuasive and can readily
be applied to the ambiguities in the 2010 amendments. Based on
the need to strike the golden mean between incentivizing
whistleblowers and preventing parasitic claims, and in light of
the recent spate of unnecessary qui tam actions (as evinced by
233. See id. (“[The FCA] is about striking the proper balance between
competing interests. The interests here are between allowing the United States
to recover . . . [while] ensuring that innocent recipients . . . are not hauled into
court . . . . We believe the FCA currently strikes that balance well.”).
234. See id. at 32 (noting a need to strike the “golden mean between
adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable
information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no
significant information to contribute of their own” (citing U.S. ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Rwy. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).
235. Id.
236. See id. (“Despite the fact that the public disclosure bar has worked well
since the 1986 amendments were adopted, H.R. 1788 would eviscerate the
bar.”).
237. See id. (“According to the Justice Department, the bill ‘severely
restricts the circumstances where the bar would apply in a way that would
reward relators with no first hand knowledge and who do not add information
beyond what is in the public domain . . . .’”).
238. See id. (“[I]f these changes were implemented, a relator could file suit
and reduce the taxpayers’ recovery even though he or she has not contributed
anything new to the Government’s case. The likely effect . . . will be to kill the
[public disclosure] bar.”) (footnote omitted).
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the Justice Department’s refusal to join 80% of the actions),
courts should read the new language cautiously. The courts
should view the new definition’s second prong as a narrow
exception to the first prong’s requirements. The vague language
independent knowledge and materially adds to should be
understood to refer to a plaintiff’s knowledge of valuable
information that substantially assists the government’s case. The
new definition’s first prong already does much to prevent
parasitic litigation by requiring relators to file suit prior to a
public disclosure; this narrow view of the second prong would
apply to cases in which the government has intervened and the
relator’s information would substantially assist the government’s
case. This interpretation harmonizes with Congress’s intent—as
demonstrated by the opponents of H.R. 1788—to ease the burden
on the Justice Department by allowing only those relators with
the valuable knowledge needed to prove the government’s case. 239
Rather than clogging the courts with qui tam actions that merely
parrot publicly disclosed allegations, the construction proposed
above will strike the proper balance by (1) requiring most relators
to file suit prior to any public disclosure and (2) allowing a select
group of relators to file after a public disclosure only when their
information substantially assists the government and the relators
have voluntarily informed the government before filing suit.
This approach would reject broader readings of the PPACA’s
new original source definition. Such broader readings might, for
instance, interpret the second prong’s requirement of knowledge
that materially adds to allegations in the public domain as
including any additional information leading to new allegations of
fraud. Under such a construction, a qui tam relator could
theoretically read about fraudulent activity in the New York
Times, provide information to the government that technically
“adds to” the allegations already made public, and share in any
recovery even if the relator’s information did not substantially
assist the prosecution of the wrongdoer or lead to a greater
recovery. In such cases, the individual qui tam plaintiff, not
necessarily the U.S. taxpayer, wins. In contrast, the narrow
construction proposed above tracks the approach of H.R. 1788’s
239. See supra text accompanying note 238 (placing emphasis on the
government’s case).
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opponents by giving proper weight both to the need to promote
qui tam actions that assist the government’s case and the
urgency of screening out parasitic suits. Under this construction,
the first prong of the original source definition would coincide
with the position of the D.C. and Sixth Circuits (outlined in Part
III), while the second prong would provide an exception, not
addressed by these Circuits, for cases in which the qui tam
relator has substantially useful knowledge and provides such
knowledge to the government before filing suit.
B. Policy Concerns
The interpretation suggested above emphasizes the danger of
parasitic qui tam actions, a danger for which there is increasing
empirical evidence. Considering empirical evidence and social
concerns, rather than focusing exclusively on legislative history,
will prove beneficial; as the Third Circuit has noted, the FCA’s
legislative history is complex enough that one can find support
for just about any interpretation of the phrase original source. 240
It is more useful, the Third Circuit also pointed out, to focus on
the original source provision’s overarching purpose, which is to
“operate somewhere between the almost unrestrained
permissiveness represented by the Marcus decision and the
restrictiveness of the post-1943 cases.” 241 The FCA’s goal has
principally been to encourage the true whistleblower—the relator
with firsthand knowledge who speaks up to prevent further
fraud. 242 As Richard Oparil observed, the FCA is just as
concerned with deterring parasitic claims as with fostering
productive suits. 243
240. See U.S. ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“The bill that eventuated in the 1986 amendments underwent
substantial revisions during its legislative path. This provides ample
opportunity to search the legislative history and find some support somewhere
for almost any construction of the many ambiguous terms in the final version.”).
241. Id. (citation omitted).
242. See id. (“One theme recurring through the legislative history . . . is the
intent to encourage persons with first-hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct
to report fraud. Congress sought to stop the ‘conspiracy of silence’ among
employees of corporations engaging in fraud.”).
243. See Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims
Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 549 (1989) (noting that the 1986 amendments retain
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Evidence of parasitic qui tam actions is alarming. One way to
gauge this threat is to examine the rate of government
intervention in qui tam actions. According to Department of
Justice data, the Attorney General has not intervened in the
majority of qui tam cases brought under the FCA. In fact, from
1987 to 2010, the government has declined to intervene in
approximately 78% of qui tam actions in which investigation is
complete. 244 While the conclusion that qui tam actions in which
the Attorney General declines to intervene are likely to be
frivolous involves an assumption, such an assumption does have
support. 245
Further, data about the disposition of qui tam cases supports
the idea that the number of frivolous suits is high. 246 Just as
there is reason to connect the Attorney General’s refusal to
intervene in the vast majority of qui tam actions with a high level
of opportunistic litigation, it is also reasonable to believe that
there is a connection between dismissals and frivolous
lawsuits. 247 Of course, the mere discovery of frivolous suits is not
dispositive, but it is “important because it indicates that qui tam
actions result in some harm to the public—a waste of the time
and money of the [United States] Attorney General’s Office.” 248
This high rate of dismissal “lends strong support to the

the FCA’s “bias against parasitic lawsuits” and that the amendments “may
deter individuals or entities from bringing a[n] FCA action if the purported
fraud has been highly publicized”).
244. Fraud Statistics, supra note 18. As of September 30, 2010, out of a total
7,201 qui tam actions filed since 1987, the government has intervened in 1,327
actions and declined to intervene in 4,628 actions. The government was still
investigating 1,246 actions.
245. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the
Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 971 (2007)
(“Based on the above analysis, there is much support for the assumption that
the Attorney General will intervene when a suit has merit.”).
246. See id. (“Data on the disposition of false claims actions also indicate
that the number of frivolous suits is high.”).
247. See id. at 971–72 (“Just as it is reasonable to presume that if qui tam
actions have merit the Attorney General will intervene, so too is it reasonable to
presume that where they are frivolous the Attorney General will not intervene
and they will ultimately be dismissed.”).
248. Id. at 972.
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conclusion that qui tam statutes result in many frivolous
claims.” 249
Professor Michael Rich also draws the conclusion that many
qui tam actions are nonmeritorious, 250 pointing out that each
year thousands of frivolous qui tam actions are filed. 251 Similarly,
Professor Dayna Bowen Matthew notes concerns with
opportunistic qui tam litigation. 252 Professor Matthew highlights
the hidden costs associated with qui tam suits: The relator’s
action is not monitored and controlled as government prosecution
would be, and this can have implications for the quality of the
litigation. 253 Attracted by the potential for monetary gain, some
relators will pursue cases lacking factual support or solid legal
theories; the result could be bad precedent and wasted public
resources. 254 Unlike the government, the private qui tam plaintiff
is not compelled to consider the larger social costs associated with
qui tam litigation, such as the impact of imposing defense costs
on target companies. 255
249. Id. at 975.
250. See generally Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the
Department of Justice to Rein in Out of Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the
Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2007–2008) (arguing for joint
and several liability for attorneys’ fees under FCA litigation and proposing that
courts require certification of novel legal theories in qui tam litigation).
251. See id. at 1264–65 (“The result is that the government does not dismiss,
and relators are allowed to proceed with, thousands of non-meritorious qui tam
[sic] suits.”).
252. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with
Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 337 (2007) (“Overenforcement by zealous ‘private
attorneys general’ has been a concern for decades. The seminal literature on
joint public-private enforcement abounds with examples.”).
253. See id. at 297 (“Privatization means the qui tam relator is not being
effectively subordinated to the Government’s direction or supervision. This has
impact on the quality of cases pursued, the number of cases pursued, and the
strength of legal theories advanced when cases are pursued.”).
254. See id. (“Due to the sizable potential of financial gain, some qui tam
relators will pursue cases with poor factual support or pursue flimsy legal
theories that establish bad precedent and waste public resources.”).
255. See id. (“[T]he relator has neither an ethical nor financial interest
compelling it to consider the impact of frivolously imposing defense costs on
target companies. The Government, on the other hand, is expected to exercise
prosecutorial discretion that takes into account what social goods might be
sacrificed [by litigation].”).
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A narrow reading of the new definition’s second prong, as
discussed above, addresses these concerns by encouraging only
select qui tam actions. In cases where allegations of fraud have
been publicly disclosed, only relators who can substantially assist
the government—not whistleblowers who remain silent until they
smell a defendant’s blood in the water—may join in a recovery
under the FCA. The concerns presented by Professors Rich and
Matthew, including increased burdens on the Justice
Department, taxpayers, and defendants, would be greatly
diminished.
What, then, is the upshot? The point is policy driven: Qui
tam actions do not exist merely to reward relators for spotting
fraud. Rather, the FCA’s mission is to reward those relators who
alert the government to false claims and fraudulent schemes that
the government would not otherwise have discovered. 256 The
social costs of qui tam litigation would outweigh its benefits were
the government’s recovery to be reduced by qui tam relators who
did not come forward until allegations of fraud became public
(unless the relator’s information is extremely valuable). 257 The
FCA’s aim is to reward the kicker who kicks the game-winning
field goal, not the second-stringer who runs onto the field to
celebrate. To use a different metaphor, if the FCA’s mission is to
incentivize the right kinds of whistleblowers—those who first
blow the whistle—then there is “little point in rewarding a second
toot” of the whistle. 258 A whistleblower, after all “sounds the
alarm; he does not echo it.” 259

256. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 28 (2009) (“[I]t is suspect that the qui tam
provisions in this bill will increase the Federal Government’s ability to recover
taxpayer dollars. Rather, it is possible that these provisions will encourage
private plaintiffs to file unfounded and parasitic lawsuits that benefit no one but
the plaintiffs and their attorneys.”).
257. See id. at 32 (noting a need for a public disclosure bar that does not
“reward relators with no first hand knowledge and who do not add information
beyond what is in the public domain”).
258. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992).
259. Id.
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V. Conclusion
The proliferation of whistleblower suits under the FCA is
reminiscent of an episode of the series Arrested Development. 260
In the episode, Michael Bluth addresses the Board of the Bluth
Company about honesty and whistleblowing. 261 Michael dumps
out a box of whistles on the boardroom table, stating that he
wants an honest company—“a building full of whistleblowers.” 262
Unfortunately for Michael, the meeting turns into an eruption of
needless whistleblowing. 263
The 2010 amendments to the FCA, if not construed
cautiously, could lead to very similar (and much less comical)
problems. Congress originally enacted the FCA to promote
honesty among independent contractors, and when relators began
to overenforce the FCA’s provisions, Congress stepped in to
prevent such abuse. 264 When this correction led to
underenforcement and reduced recoveries for the government,
Congress enacted the 1986 amendments in an effort to strike the
crucial balance between proper qui tam actions and
opportunism. 265 The courts have wrestled with this golden mean
ever since. 266 Today, when the Attorney General’s office declines
to put its seal of approval on the vast majority of qui tam actions,
and when thousands of frivolous FCA actions are filed each
year, 267 it is important that Congress and the courts not forget
that the FCA’s mission is not just to expose fraud but to save the
government valuable resources. Using the approach outlined
above will help strike the proper balance by requiring relators to
260. See Arrested Development: Whistler’s Mother (Fox television broadcast
Apr. 4, 2004).
261. See id. (“He’s right; we don’t need a whistleblower. We need a building
full of whistleblowers.”).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 11–78 (detailing the FCA’s
background).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (describing the 1986
amendments).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 96–203 (discussing various judicial
interpretations of the FCA’s “original source” provision).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 244–59 (discussing evidence for
frivolous qui tam actions).
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provide their information to the government prior to any public
disclosure. Construing the second prong of the new definition as a
narrow exception to the first prong will ensure that, in cases in
which allegations of fraud are already public, only relators with
information essential to the government’s case will be able to
take advantage of the FCA’s provisions.

